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abstract 
Education as identity formation in Western-style liberal-democracies relies, in part, on 
neutrality as a justification for the reproduction of collective individual identity, including 
societal, cultural, institutional and political identities, many aspects of which are 
problematic in terms of the reproduction of environmentally harmful attitudes, beliefs and 
actions. Taking a position on an issue necessitates letting go of certain forms of neutrality, 
as does effectively teaching environmental education. We contend that to claim a stance of 
neutrality is to claim a position beyond criticism. In the classroom this can also be an 
epistemically damaging position to hold. To further explore the problem of neutrality in 
the classroom, and to offer a potential solution, we will look to the philosophical 
community of inquiry pedagogy, and advocate for the addition of place-based education; 
a form of experiential education that promotes learning in local communities in which the 
school is situated, each with its own history, culture, economy and environment. However, 
how we understand ‘place’ is fundamental to understanding the potential of place-based 
education in giving students a ‘sense of place’—how they perceive a place, which includes 
place attachment and place meaning. To this end, we look to Indigenous understandings 
of Place and social reconstruction learning to inform place-based pedagogies. Doing so, we 
hold, opens a pathway to ethical education. 
 
keywords: environmental philosophy; ecofeminism; placed-base education; philosophy 
with children; critical indigenous pedagogy. 
 
educación filosófica situada: reconstruir el "lugar", reconstruir la ética 
 
resumen 
La educación como formación de la identidad en las democracias liberales de estilo 
occidental se basa, en parte, en la neutralidad como justificación para la reproducción de la 
identidad individual colectiva, incluidas las identidades sociales, culturales, institucionales 
y políticas, muchos de cuyos aspectos son problemáticos en cuanto a la reproducción de 
actitudes, creencias y acciones perjudiciales para el medio ambiente. Tomar una posición 
sobre un tema requiere dejar de lado ciertas formas de neutralidad, al igual que la 
enseñanza efectiva de la educación ambiental. Sostenemos que reclamar una postura de 
neutralidad es reclamar una posición más allá de la crítica. En el aula, esta postura también 
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puede ser epistemológicamente perjudicial. Para profundizar en el problema de la 
neutralidad en el aula, y ofrecer una posible solución, nos dirigiremos a la pedagogía de la 
comunidad de indagación filosófica, y abogaremos por la incorporación de una educación 
situada; una forma de educación experimental que promueve el aprendizaje en las 
comunidades locales en las que se encuentra la escuela, cada una con su propia historia, 
cultura, economía y medio ambiente. Sin embargo, la forma en que entendemos el "lugar" 
es fundamental para comprender el potencial de la educación situada para dar a los 
estudiantes un "sentido del lugar", es decir, la forma en que perciben un lugar, que incluye 
el apego al lugar y el significado del lugar. Con este fin, nos fijamos en la comprensión 
indígena del lugar y en el aprendizaje de la reconstrucción social para dar forma a las 
pedagogías situadas, basadas en el lugar. De este modo, sostenemos que se abre un camino 
hacia la educación ética. 
 
palabras clave: filosofía ambiental; ecofeminismo; educación basada en el lugar; filosofía 
con niños; pedagogía indígena crítica. 
 
educação filosófica baseada no lugar: reconstruindo o "lugar", reconstruindo a ética 
 
A educação como formação da identidade nas democracias liberais de estilo ocidental 
baseia-se, em parte, na neutralidade como uma justificativa para a reprodução da 
identidade individual coletiva, incluindo identidades sociais, culturais, institucionais e 
políticas, muitos aspectos dos quais são problemáticos em termos de reprodução de 
atitudes, crenças e ações ambientalmente prejudiciais para o meio ambiente. Para se 
posicionar sobre uma questão, é necessário abrir mão de certas formas de neutralidade, 
assim como efetivamente ensinar educação ambiental. Afirmamos que reivindicar uma 
posição de neutralidade é reivindicar uma posição além da crítica. Na sala de aula, essa 
também pode ser uma posição epistemologicamente prejudicial de se ocupar. Para explorar 
ainda mais o problema da neutralidade na sala de aula e para oferecer uma possível 
solução, olharemos para a pedagogía da comunidade filosófica de investigação filosófica e 
defenderemos a incorporação da uma educação situada; uma forma de educação 
experimental que promove a aprendizagem nas comunidades locais em que a escola está 
inserida, cada uma com sua própria história, cultura, economia e meio ambiente. No 
entanto, como entendemos o "lugar" é fundamental para compreender o potencial da 
educação baseada no lugar em dar aos estudantes um "sentido de lugar" - como eles 
percebem um lugar, que inclui apego ao lugar e significado de lugar. Para este fim, olhamos 
para as compreensões indígenas do lugar e da aprendizagem da reconstrução social para 
dar forma as pedagogias baseadas no lugar. Desse modo, acreditamos, que se abre um 
caminho para a educação ética. 
 
palavras-chave: filosofia ambiental; ecofeminismo; educação baseada em localização; 
filosofia com crianças; pedagogia indígena crítica. 
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introduction 
Philosophy is one of the oldest intellectual traditions, from which many other 
areas of disciplinary inquiry have emerged, yet its representation in schools is 
woeful. So too is the understanding surrounding its educational potential (Burgh & 
Thornton, 2019a). However, a growing body of studies on Philosophy for Children 
(P4C) is slowly changing perceptions of philosophy’s potential. These studies 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the community of inquiry pedagogy, indicating 
marked cognitive and social benefits (see e.g., Millett & Tapper, 2011; Garcia-
Moriyon, Robello and Colom, 2005; Trickey & Topping, 2004, 2006, 2007; Topping 
& Trickey, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). We aim to show that philosophy has further 
potential as a framework for environmental education or sustainability education. 
However, we argue that it needs to be educationally situated as place-based 
education as a radical move toward cultural renewal to deal with the socio-
ecological crises. 
Education is a form of cultural renewal, but as Val Plumwood (2002) 
observes, no culture that has set ‘in motion massive processes of biospheric 
degradation which it has normalised, and which it cannot respond to or correct can 
hope to survive for very long’ (p. 1). To address climate change and other pressing 
environment issues, we argue that a cultural overhaul is needed, including an 
overhaul of education. A new framework for education that is not premised on the 
‘business as usual’ approach to education as the perpetuation of existing social, 
cultural, and political structures is required. What Thomas Colwell (1970) calls 
‘keeping school’ traps education within the same environmentally destructive 
paradigm that has contributed to our present environmental predicament. Keeping 
education attune to the demands of the market, towards the development of a 
workforce wholly unprepared for climate change, represents a failure to adequately 
prepare the next generation—intellectually, emotionally, and physically—for an 
increasingly uncertain future. Neutrality is often to be found in arguments for 
keeping school. 
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Education as identity formation in Western-style democracies (i.e., liberal-
democratic nation-states) relies in part on neutrality as a justification for the 
reproduction of collective individual identity including societal, cultural, 
institutional and political identities, many aspects of which are problematic in terms 
of the reproduction of environmentally harmful attitudes, beliefs and actions. 
Taking a position on an issue necessitates letting go of certain forms of neutrality, 
as does effectively teaching environmental education. We contend that to claim a 
stance of neutrality is, more often than not, to claim a position beyond criticism. In 
the classroom this can also be an epistemically damaging position to hold, especially 
to those who suffer from, what Plumwood (1995) calls, ‘the twin offspring of the 
same processes of development’: impoverishment and environmental degradation 
(p. 139).  
To further explore the problem of neutrality in the classroom, and to offer a 
potential solution, we will look to the philosophical community of inquiry 
pedagogy, and advocate for the addition of place-based education; a form of 
experiential education (or pedagogy of experiential learning) that promotes 
learning in local communities in which the school is situated, each with its own 
history, culture, economy and environment. However, as we shall see, how we 
imagine ‘place’ in place-based education is of vital ethical importance. Nature or the 
environment is not simply that which lies outside of ourselves; a stage to act out our 
existence. The line between humans and ‘nature’ is fuzzy at best, and a harmful 
delusion at worst, but no matter where we draw it, it is always an ethical one 
demarcating what and who is and is not valued. 
To gain a greater understanding of place, we begin our inquiry by offering a 
brief history of the dominant logic that has shaped and continues to shape the way 
Empire relates to, understands, and theorises place. We argue that the relationship 
between Empire and place is premised on a morality of self-interest which ushers 
in a survivalist ethos. Such an ethic is not robust enough to address either 
environmental or social challenges (Routley, 1998). To address such challenges 
requires an expansion of our ethical circles beyond the liberal conception of the 
individual as the fundamental component of value, an atomistic individual around 
thornton; graham; burgh 
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which an ethic of self-interest or egoism draws its line of concern. It is a line too 
often policed in classrooms around the globe, through an insistence on educational 
neutrality. Neutrality is a myth; a way of dismissing, among other things, those who 
would seek to extend the purview of ethics. Aboriginal custodial ethics extends 
ethical standing far beyond that of the atomistic individual. The custodial ethic 
emerges out of place and is also a structuring force, which for tens of thousands of 
years resulted in stable and flourishing societies.  
We argue that place-based education has the potential to overcome 
educational neutrality; however, we also account for criticisms of epistemic bias in 
its claim to pedagogy and curriculum neutrality, specifically its continuation of the 
nature/human dualism. Thereafter, we introduce Jennifer Bleazby’s (2004, 2013) 
‘social reconstruction learning’ which allows students to connect with communities 
to reconstruct their learning experiences. Bleazby’s framework integrates 
Philosophy for Children, ecofeminism and the philosophy of John Dewey including 
his views on experiential education. In doing so, we argue that social reconstruction 
learning, as the basis for place-based education, has the potential to overcome the 
nature/human dualism, with the addition of an Indigenous ethical understanding 
of place. To this end, we look to custodial ethics as a necessary component of place-
based pedagogies, which, in conjunction with social reconstruction learning as an 
exemplar of educational philosophy (philosophy functioning educationally), 




How we understand ‘place’ is fundamental to understanding the potential of 
place-based education in giving students a ‘sense of place’—how they perceive a 
place, which includes place attachment, place meaning, and place-responsiveness 
(see Kudryavtsev, Stedman & Krasny, 2012; Renshaw & Tooth, 2018). Following 
Critical Indigenous Pedagogy,4 ‘a reflexive discourse constantly in search of an 
 
4 According to Denzin and Lincoln (2008), Critical Indigenous Pedagogy acknowledges ‘that all 
inquiry is both political and moral. It uses methods critically for explicit social justice purposes. It 
values the transformative power of indigenous, subjugated knowledges. It values the pedagogical 
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open-ended, subversive, multivoiced epistemology’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p. 6), 
this paper rests on the axiom that ‘the human social world is embedded in and part 
of the natural world, with all its complexities, relations and repetitions’ (Cole & 
Somerville, 2020, p. 1). In other words, humans, and all human activities, are part 
of nature and not hyper-separated from other natural phenomena (Plumwood, 
2001), like the atomistic conception of the liberal individual. Not only are we not 
independent of nature, insofar as we belong to the natural, physical, or material 
world, but the human body is itself an ecosystem.5 We, therefore, concur with Freya 
Mathews that the distinction between the ‘artefactual and the natural’ is 
problematic 
on the grounds that, since human beings, as biological organisms, 
surely belong to nature, and since making things comes to us as 
naturally as eating and drinking do, our handiwork itself has as 
much a claim to be considered part of nature as the handiwork of 
spiders, insects and marine life does.   (Matthews, 2004, n.p.) 
From this perspective, we cannot separate environmentalism from struggles 
for social justice (Mathews, 2008, p. 319). We are not atomistic individuals, in the 
sense that classical liberalism or other similar or related conceptions of 
personhood assume. 
These views, along with the self-interested ethics that usually accompanies 
them, predominantly inform the dominant Western understanding of ‘human 
nature’, which is built into the institutional practices of Western-style democracies 
including education. Such an understanding of human nature issues in a stark 
separation between humans and nature as ‘[t]he place where we are is the place 
where nature is not’ (Cronon, 1995, p. 80). The definition of human is operational 
upon that which it is not, namely nature. Our conception of ‘environment’, 
 
practices that produce these knowledges (Semali & Kincheloe, 1999, p. 15), and it seeks forms of 
praxis and inquiry that are emancipatory and empowering. It embraces the commitment by 
indigenous scholars to decolonize Western methodologies, to criticize and demystify the ways in 
which Western science and the modern academy have been part of the colonial apparatus’ (p. 2). 
5 Nature can be independent of humans as there was a time when humans did not exist, and this 
time could well come again. However, nothing, including humans, can exist outside of nature. It is 
then, much simpler to posit humans as a part of, rather than separate to, nature. To do this, we do 
not have to collapse all differences between humans and nature, in fact, the axiom is so simple that 
we would not need to state it at all where it not for the strong tradition within philosophy that has, 
since before the time of Socrates, attempted to split the two. Environmental philosophy has emerged, 
in large part, to counter this tradition.  
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therefore, rejects the nature/human dualism and nature as ‘other’ narrative that are 
products of Western cultural history, which Plumwood (1993) calls ‘the 
foundational delusion of the West’ and ‘a dangerous doctrine, strongly implicated 
in the environmental crisis’ (p. 42). It is a doctrine that brings into existence a 
survivalist ethos; a concept we explore in the next section.  
Plumwood (1993) and others have argued that Western philosophy 
developed a set of interconnected dualisms which divide the epistemic from the 
ontic, for example, mind from body, human from nature, theory from practice, 
order from disorder, man from woman. As a result, traditionally, epistemology is 
valued over and above ontology. In education, this formula of valuation has been 
extensively traced by Bleazby; from Plato, an early architect of dualist thinking, 
through to the way we value subjects (Bleazby, 2015), the way education devalues 
the imagination, emotions and practical experiences, in favour of a universal 
conception of ‘reason’ (Bleazby, 2012) and separates the classroom from the larger 
contexts within which it is situated, i.e., society, industry and the environment  –  
the split between theory and practice (Bleazby, 2013).  
Plato effectively split the realm of the Forms – ideal, perfect knowledge – 
from earth, which he took to be a corrupt version of the Forms. This split, or hyper-
separation, came to define universal Truth (capital ‘T’) in opposition to place, and 
much work has been done by subsequent philosophers to cement this view of Truth 
into the foundations of Empire, just as many others, like Plumwood, have decried 
its dangers. We use the word ‘cement’ purposefully for the connotations it carries. 
Empires are built upon rigid foundations; foundations that do not move or change, 
that are impervious to reinvention, recreation or reimagination. Empires colonise. 
In other words, they create a ‘built environment’ to which all others must adapt or 
perish (Thornton, Graham & Burgh, 2019, p. 244). Ideas, thoughts, and theories 
create built environments, i.e., epistemology shapes ontology. According to 
Plumwood (2002), Empire conceives of the colonised as ‘disorderly’ and dictates 
that ‘the assimilating project of the coloniser is to remake the colonised and their 
space in the image of the coloniser’s own self-space, their own culture or land, 
which is represented as the paradigm of reason, beauty and order’ (p. 14). 
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The result of such constructions and constrictions is the dual creation of 
institutions divorced from Land6 and shadow places; ‘places that provide our 
material and ecological support, most of which, in a global market, are likely to 
elude our knowledge and responsibility. This is not an ecological form of 
consciousness’ (Plumwood, 2008, n.p. italics added). Shadow places cast a shadow 
over ethical responsibility and obligation, obscuring our knowledge of the places 
upon which our existence depends, driving impoverishment and environmental 
degradation (Plumwood, 1995, p. 139). When we view ourselves through the lens 
of dualisms, as hyper-separated from place, we perpetuate the existence of shadow 
places and the environmental injustice they spawn. ‘As hyper-individuals, we owe 
nothing to nobody, not to our mothers, let alone to any nebulous earth community’ 
(Plumwood, 2001, p. 91). Attuning our attention to place, then, becomes an ethical 
matter and a necessary first step to realising our obligations to place. Imaginings of 
place ‘must aim to replace the consumer-driven narratives of place that mark our 
lives by different ones that make our ecological relationships visible and 
accountable’ (Plumwood, 2008, n.p.).  
 
two ethical orientations: freedom and rights, obligation to land 
‘The central crisis, as defined by Native Canadian, Hawaiian, Māori, and 
American Indian pedagogy, is spiritual, “rooted in the increasingly virulent 
relationship between human beings and the rest of nature” (Grande, 2000, p. 354)’ 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p. 17). From an Aboriginal perspective, separation from 
nature was the beginnings of a commodification of nature: ‘spirit or the sacred has 
been reified by Westerners as “money”: Western behaviour, as we have observed it 
over the last two hundred years, is consistent with that of a community for whom 
money is sacred’ (Graham 1999, p. 8). With the sacralising of money, the relational 
is reduced to the economic, that which money can buy, and ‘everything has a price’; 
therefore, with enough money nothing is off-limits, and nothing is sacred. 
Neoliberal laissez-faire economics illustrates this well—potentially everything is 
 
6 The term Land (capital L) denotes biodiversity, biosphere, nature, the natural world, environment, 
earth, wildlife, geographical and geological forms, ecosystem, landscape, flora, and fauna. 
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reduced to economic value and, thus, of instrumental value only. In this way the 
sacralising of money co-exists with an ethic that values only individualism; the right 
of the individual to freedom and self-realisation, which entails the fundamental 
right to life, liberty, and property.  
As the very nature of the liberal individual is that of an individual human 
being abstracted from social context and nature, such an ethic does not provide a 
basis for obligation only a right to exercise freedom.  Following this line of thought, 
a strange and terrible freedom is obtained; a freedom from ethical limits, 
precariously restrained only by a self-regulating society of individuals—essentially 
a minimalist politic of self-interest, in which individuals compete for resources to 
survive. This can be described as a survivalist ethos, 
a form of self-orientation where the self is placed at a distance from 
others because all environments—natural, human, and social—are 
seen as potentially hostile; so, the self has to arm itself psychically 
and physically to keep ‘safe’. Social and technological 
developments ensue, and then praxis follows which includes the 
normalisation of competitiveness. (Graham, 2021, p. 8) 
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill (1859) articulates a core tenet of liberalism—
and, by extension, traditional Western values that underpin liberal-democratic 
political and social institutions. He focusses on the principle of equal consideration 
of interests; that individuals are free to do as they please provided their actions do 
not harm others (i.e., impinge upon the freedom of other individuals). Thus, Mill’s 
conception of liberty, in which individuals are self-interested, equal, and rational, 
has self-regarding and other-regarding morality as two sides of the same coin. 
Thereby, political intervention is limited regarding self-interest, or as Mill put it: 
‘That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (p. 
223). However, harm, in the traditional liberal sense, means harm only to other 
humans, hence Richard Sylvan (2009) deems the harm principle to be founded on 
‘human chauvinism’, a prejudicial preference for the human species above all 
others.  
The lack of ethical consideration given to nature means that nature then 
becomes open to ‘instrumental use’ as defined and regulated by systems other than 
ethics; primarily legal, economic, and political. Spirituality and the sacred, 
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accordingly, is restricted to religion, usually monotheistic religions that create a 
Platonic split between earth and spirit. Western religion has traditionally viewed 
the spirituality of place as something to be overcome or drawn into 
its larger scheme which figures the value of place accordingly, in the 
largely instrumental terms of leading us to a higher, non-earthly 
place. Historical Christianity, as John Passmore remarks, often saw 
pagan place and nature reverence as its main enemy, and set itself 
the task of destroying pagan shrines or absorbing them into its own 
framework of transcendence. (Plumwood, 2001, p. 219, italics 
added) 
As did and does Empire. In many cultures around the world, spirit conjures 
up thoughts of the supernatural, which is neither earth nor human, but greater than 
or superior to both.  
However, in many other cultures, including Aboriginal culture, spirit 
emerges from earth and is a part of nature. Accordingly, organisms and the earth 
are sacred, valued, relational; based on relationships of respect and understanding 
learnt over enormous spans of time. The sacred calls forth limitations on acts and, 
in doing so, extends ethics to nature. Aboriginal ethics are ethics of a particular kind, 
not strictly deontological rule-based ethics, nor strictly consequentialist, outcome-
based tools used to determine the rightness of an act, although they often contain 
elements of both. In Western philosophical terms, Aboriginal ethics resembles an 
ethic of flourishing, but one which extends far beyond the Aristotelian sense of 
‘human flourishing’ as life with other people, to include ecological others. Even 
though Aristotle had greater faith in the earth than Plato, he still delivers us a very 
human-centred notion of flourishing:  
Aristotle’s metaphysic does not develop in a holistic or systemic 
direction, but stops short at an emphatic form of individualism – a 
pluralism of discrete biological individuals. The concrete relations 
in which these individuals stand to one another are entirely external 
to their identity, and in principle such individuals could be 
rearranged or reshuffled at will. There is no anticipation here of the 
concept of ecology, or of the indivisibility of systems. (Mathews, 
1991, p. 109) 
Contra Aristotle, Aboriginal ethics is holistic and relational. Land is the great 
teacher, the first value. Land is sacred and the beginning of ethics, as it is the 
beginning of all things; that which confers responsibility. Value comes from the 
Land, just as we, the valuers come from the Land. Put another way, Land, to use an 
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Aristotelian term, is first principle (i.e., a foundational proposition or assumption 
that cannot be deduced from other propositions or assumptions); ‘the Land is the 
Law’ (Graham, 2013, p. 2). However, in liberal political theory ‘law’ refers to the rule 
of law, which is one of the core principles of liberal constitutionalism, aimed at 
protecting the fundamental rights of individuals, including the security of persons, 
property (i.e., ownership and contract), and human rights. Laws are supposed to 
guide the ethical conduct of the individual regarding these fundamental rights, 
which implies preventing harm to other individuals and their interests (i.e., the 
application of Mill’s harm principle). Conversely, the Aboriginal approach is to 
locate Law as first principle, as the sacralised and foundational, relationalist 
principle of the Land as the source of the Law.  
Land has created everything including humans. This is seen by many 
cultures as an instinctually maternal process (e.g., ‘Mother Nature’) and inherently 
spiritual: ‘Land is a moral entity with both physical and spiritual attributes manifest 
in myriad life forms’ (Graham, 2013, p. 2). From this, ‘spiritual significance and 
meaning arises, and more obligations develop with particularised responsibilities 
according to place/locality’ (Graham, 2013, p. 5). Ethics, then, is not based solely on 
character, received commands, rules, universal principles or consequences 
(although it can certainly take many of these into account), it ‘grows in a natural 
organic way with the deepening of feeling coalesced with stewardship practices’ 
(Graham, 2013, p. 5). These senses or feelings are reified into socially constructed 
systems of governance. Through understanding the value of Land and self we 
become civilised, and in this way ‘[e]thics becomes habituated and made valuable, rather 
than idealised’ (Graham, 2013, p. 2). According to this view, civilisation cannot be 
separated from ethics, nor can ethics be reduced to rules, consequences, or the 
market. Such paths lead to the widespread instability we are facing today, and both 
stem from and reinforce a survivalist ethos.  
In a Heraclitean universe of flux,7 instability is a part of the process of the 
world, a part of living that must be faced and understood for both practical and 
 
7 In the pre-Socratic days of philosophy, Parmenides (539-469 BCE) dreamt of a visit to a goddess who 
described to him the nature of the universe; a nature fundamentally fixed, finished, and static. 
Around the same time, Heraclitus (540-475 BCE) expounded his understanding of the universe as one 
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ethical reasons. On the practical side, understanding the process of flux, of being 
and becoming, can facilitate flourishing. However, it is necessary to understand in 
a way that is relational and accounts for the flourishing of other organisms, 
including ensuring the other’s continued existence. Such understanding allows for 
the emergence of a custodial ethic; an obligation to care for country, and a necessary 
condition for the creation of a stable and flourishing society.  
In Australian Aboriginal culture, ethics, beginning with Land, is a 
structuring force that ‘lays the foundations for the organising principle that governs 
the social and political structures, decision-making and conflict management 
systems developed over an immense period of time, forming the basis of our 
concept of Sovereignty’ (Graham, 2013, p. 1). Balance and stability are achieved 
through protocols based on the custodial ethic, i.e., non-hierarchical, non-
dominating, and respectful, which developed in relationship to Land and others 
over tens of thousands of years. Stability, in the political sense, does not need to be 
viewed in opposition to flux as an understanding of flux in itself helps create 
stability. Protocols were developed through careful observation and detailed 
communication, aimed at the preservation and reproduction of knowledge tied to 
the preservation and reproduction of Land. Communication took and continues to 
take many forms, for example, teaching, conferences, storytelling, painting, dancing 
and songlines, the combination of which  
function both to impress their meanings cunningly and irresistibly 
in the memory, and to bind together botanical, experiential, 
practical and philosophical knowledge, community identity and 
spiritual practice in a rich and satisfying integration of what we 
[non-Indigenous people] usually place in opposing groups of life 
and theory [dualisms]. (Plumwood, 2012, p. 27) 
These ‘opposing groups’ form the basis of a Western reductionist worldview. 
According to Aboriginal ethics, flourishing is not thought of in terms of the 
atomistic individual but in terms of the group, which is ‘not to say that the group is 
 
of constant flux, change and becoming. From humble beginnings great things grow, and the division 
between the ideas of Heraclitus and Parmenides spread like wildfire throughout the Western 
philosophical canon. Although the Greeks themselves disagreed about the ontological opposites of 
Becoming (Heraclitus) and Being (Parmenides), they may have started to appreciate some form of 
resolution between the two notions, if they had known about the Dreaming and Aboriginal ideas 
concerning the Law. 
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more important than the individual, nor is it a competition between the 
group/others and the individual, but rather that the group is the originator of 
Being; that Being comes from and is shared by and with others’ (Graham, 2013, p. 
4) including environments. Places, like humans, are autonomous and in ‘terms of 
values, the aim of the organising principle is to respect and protect the integrity of 
Regional Clan/group and individual values and rights’ (Graham, 2013, p. 5). The 
concept of autonomous regard,8 as an integral component of an Aboriginal ethic, is 
a way of gazing at each other from a distance. The distance is necessary for respect, 
for recognition of sovereignty, of limits, and also the existence of the self in the other, 
because, although distant, the self is not starkly separate from the self of the other. 
Autonomous regard also extends to non-human others; hence, nature, as human, 
non-human and land, is not seen as starkly other, and the value it holds is not only 
monetary or instrumental, but sacralised.  
This relationalist system, emerging from Land and collectively applied in 
social and political ordering, would manifest as something like a ‘Law of 
Obligation’ – a fully relational system. The Law of Obligation, then, brings about a 
collective ethical responsibility  
to look after Land, family and community, which is vital in 
transcending the persuasion of advantage at the expense of others. 
This approach is centred in the significance of Place, a particular 
locality (or localities) of Land within a particular region. ‘Land’ 
includes the landscape and all living things within it, humans, 
spirits, animals, air, sea, rivers, moon, stars, birds, insects, the wind, 
language, dreams etc; with Place the core interest, conscience and 
spirit of culture. These collective values are the template for looking 
after the whole society, that is, part of the organising principle of 
society. (Graham, 2013, p. 4) 
The custodial ethic is the combination of many laws of obligation – 
reciprocity, sharing, stewardship, looking after relations etc., with the cultivation of 
people’s qualities of mind, character, and behaviour. These obligatory habits 
become a tradition which collectively becomes a general law underpinned by the 
sacralising of land – a process of becoming and being.  
 
8 Not to be mistaken for the liberal notion of autonomy as ‘individual autonomy’, understood as the 
capacity to be our own person, to be independent of others—to live according to reasons and motives 
that are our own and not the result of manipulation from external forces. 
place-based philosophical education: reconstructing ‘place’, reconstructing ethics  
14                  childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 17, abr. 2021, pp. 01- 29                 issn 1984-5987 
Atomic individualism, which manifests in an ethic of individual freedom and 
human rights, as the basis of Western ethics and politics stemming from liberal 
theory, means individuals are not bound by claims that are independent of their 
private interests. This leaves people exposed to a world without the Law of 
Obligation, open to the threat of collective living without the self-awareness 
required to live ethical relationships with other, both human and non, and earth. 
The Law of Obligation prevents or can prevent a collective ‘crossing the Rubicon’ 
or ‘point of no return’ step into the barbarism of nuclear bombing or invading other 
people’s countries.9 If primitiveness, meaning a kind of end justifies the means 
rationale, is the path chosen, barbarism is or becomes the variety of methods utilised 
to gain the wished-for outcome. For example, if a Law of Obligation was in place 
and adhered to, it is doubtful that Rio Tinto would have blown-up a 46,000-year-
old sacred site10 or that climate change would be worsening unchecked.  
 
teaching values in a changing society: can teachers be neutral?  
Our discussion so far, regarding two seemingly different approaches to 
ethics, which rely on different views of the relationship between humans and their 
environment, has bearing on education and identity formation in Western-style 
democracies. Education plays a major role in the transmission of culture, insofar as 
it cannot be avoided. If teachers adopt a neutral stance rather than taking an active 
role in the process, they, wittingly. or unwittingly, perpetuate the transmission of 
dominant beliefs and values, creating epistemically built environments which 
exclude those cultural ways of knowing, being and doing that do not fit the 
dominant mould. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that education should 
be geared towards diversity so that epistemically dominating values do not go 
unchallenged, but, instead, stimulate discussion on cultural norms, including 
values, beliefs, knowledge, and experiences. However, confronted by the assertions 
 
9 Arguably, mechanistic science was such a moment, as Merchant (2012) puts it: ‘Technologies and 
attitudes of domination stemming from the Scientific Revolution have acted as a legitimating 
framework, enabling humans to threaten nature with deforestation and desertification, chemical 
pollution, destruction of habitats and species, and ultimately with nuclear fallout, ozone depletion, 
and global warming’ (p. 3). 
10 https://www.abc.net.au/religion/stop-destroying-indigenous-sites-and-lives-morgan-brigg-
and-mar/12355284 
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of some contemporary philosophers who herald the end of philosophy’s role as a 
privileged, truth-telling discourse, some teachers might be uncomfortable with 
taking such a position, mistakenly viewing the recognition of a diversity of values 
with promoting moral relativism and, thus, anything goes. Others might be 
reluctant to challenge students’ values in order to respect students, or they may 
think that teaching any kind of values is a form of indoctrination. In the classroom, 
this can lead to ‘teacher neutrality’, the practice of taking no position on issues as a 
pedagogical strategy. 
The notion of neutrality conflicts with claims about knowledge by both 
absolutists and relativists. Absolutism assumes there to be a fixed, objective reality 
that can be represented accurately through thoughts, ideas, judgements, statements, 
assertions, utterances, propositions, or beliefs that correspond to this reality. It 
assumes that a meta-justification for our evaluative or normative systems can be 
found. But this requires us to start and end somewhere, namely, with knowledge-
seeking humans who are fallible epistemic agents not disembodied, impartial, and 
objective observers. On the other hand, relativists claim that truth is constructed 
and relative to particular cultures, times, places, or individuals and, thus, 
justifications are perspectival and interest relative. To the relativist, 
we are never able to transcend or suppress our own situatedness 
and interests. Thus, even if there is some ultimate, fixed reality we 
would not be able to know it as it ‘really’ is. Rather, all experience 
and inquiry is conducted through our personal interests, values, 
and concrete situatedness. Consequently, truth claims reflect the 
individuals who construct them. (Bleazby, 2011, p. 455) 
The problem that arises with relativism in relation to ethics is the inability to 
judge other people’s opinions, beliefs, and actions. In education, epistemic, ethical 
and value judgements can be intentional or unintentional regarding the selection of 
what counts as ‘appropriate’ curriculum materials and classroom strategies for 
teaching, as the education process includes judgements made by teachers, teacher-
educators, policy-makers, curriculum writes, principles, peers, parents and 
politicians, all of whom bring their pre-existing ethical and moral frameworks to 
bear. This indicates that neutrality, the practice of taking no position on issues, is 
untenable. On the one hand, if we adopt the absolutist position, teachers should 
teach absolute values. On the other hand, if we adopt the relativist position, teachers 
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cannot escape teaching their own values through the hidden curriculum or allowing 
those present in the classroom via students, curriculum materials, and institutional 
structures, to percolate. The act of teaching in itself is an ethical act.  
Neutrality as an educational ideal can fall into two broad categories: 
procedural neutrality and content neutrality. Procedural neutrality, also referred to 
as instrumental neutrality or pedagogical neutrality, is the view that teachers 
facilitate classroom discussions impartially and refrain from expressing their own 
views or ‘taking sides’ on the topics under discussion. Content neutrality, which can 
be curriculum neutrality or more broadly structural neutrality, is the view that 
curriculum or education policy can be free of ideology or cultural bias toward 
diversity of cultural positions. Claims of procedural and content neutrality 
commonly refer to taking a neutral stance or refraining from making judgments on 
values, but neutrality can apply also to beliefs, knowledge, skills, attitudes, and 
norms. Neutrality also implies tolerance, not being judgemental, and acting without 
bias. 
Neutrality has a long history outside debates on ethics and classroom 
practice. For example, the ancient Skeptics suspended judgement about beliefs as 
they thought there to be no truth or certainty. Another example can be found in the 
separation of church and state (facilitated by the Establishment Clause in the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution) which was extended to the 
separation of church and public education (through the 1947 Everson v. Board of 
Education and 1962 Engel v. Vitale rulings of the United States Supreme Court). 
David E. Denton (1963) noted that the shift in education from a religious to a secular, 
naturalistic base included a shift away from religious-based moral education. This 
shift was characterised at the classroom level by the transition ‘from an emphasis 
on values to an emphasis on techniques of teaching Skills’ (p. 1), as it was thought 
that skills were value-neutral. 
However, Denton contended that the push to create a value neutral, skills-
based educational system is lost the moment decisions of content and methodology, 
of what and how we teach, are made, as ‘norms constitute the nature of those 
decisions’ (p. 2). Viewed in this way, skills training did not replace the transmission 
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of values, it made it implicit, unexamined and unintended; or put another way, the 
transmission of norms, values and beliefs in the classroom seep in from the social 
and political environment through classroom teachers, students and curricula. The 
general result is that values are taught, but not well. As it stands, young people are, 
as Denton says, inducted into a system of ethical decisions that ‘have already been 
made for them. In addition, the teacher is almost invariably concerned, not only 
with facts, but with goods and preferences and desires and “shoulds” which 
eventually reveal the kind of Universe the teacher feels ought to be’ (p. 4). The 
process of instilling values becomes the realm of individual teachers in which their 
values can be transmitted uncritically and often unwittingly to their students in an 
attempt to maintain neutrality.  
For Paulo Freire (1970), a neutral educational process is not possible. In the 
Foreword to Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Richard Shaull (1970) makes the following 
observation of Freire’s position: 
There is no such thing as a neutral educational process. Education 
either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the 
integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present 
system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes “practice of 
freedom”, the means by which men and women deal critically and 
creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the 
transformation of their world. (p. 34) 
Freire’s words highlight the relationship between the perpetuation of the 
dominant logic and an emancipatory pedagogy, and neither are positions of 
neutrality. In countries in which Empire built the dominant logic, its perpetuation 
through education is a contributing factor to the following question: ‘Will there ever 
be a use-by date for Empire? Or will Empire simply dominate behind another face?’ 
(Graham, 2014, p. 22).  
Unlike other approaches to education, Philosophy for Children places 
emphasis on fallibilism, self-correction and continuous inquiry and, thus, it holds 
emancipatory promise, but to fulfil such promise the problem of neutrality must be 
faced. The community of inquiry as pedagogy, underpins Philosophy for Children; 
a reconstruction by Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp of the 
Peircean/Buchlerian notion of community of inquiry into an educational practice 
begun in the 1960’s. Lipman (2004) was influenced by Dewey’s progressive ideas 
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on education, which he thought Dewey had ‘treated too lightly, even superficially’ 
(p. 3). Together, Lipman and Sharp (1978) developed the community of inquiry as 
an approach to teaching that transforms the structure of the classroom in 
fundamental ways; it emphasises community as a method of investigation, a 
purposive activity of inquiry, experimentation and collaboration driven by 
intelligent curiosity that arises from a ‘sense of genuine doubt that signals a rupture 
in consciousness’ (Gregory & Granger, 2012, p. 6).  Philosophy for Children ‘aims 
to foster a wide range of thinking skills; meaningfulness; participatory democracy; 
and the dispositions needed to effectively participate in communal inquiries, such 
as reasonableness, open-mindedness, care and respect for others, imaginativeness, 
and a willingness to self-correct’ (Bleazby, 2020).  
However, as Bleazby cautions, ‘[h]aving originally emerged from the 
Western philosophical canon, P4C’s materials and methods must always be used 
cautiously and critically, remaining open to being transformed or even replaced 
when they are used within different contexts’ (n.p.). In the context of environmental 
education, we argue that the community of inquiry must be reconstructed into a 
community of place-based inquiry. This is particularly important in light of Hell 
Rainville’s (2001) critique of Philosophy for Children. Rainville’s concern is that 
Philosophy for Children’s ‘purportedly neutral approach to philosophical inquiry 
may unwittingly contribute to the marginalization of Indigenous peoples both in 
North America and around the world’ (p. 67). She observes that: ‘I have yet to read 
a paper in the growing body of Philosophy for Children literature which 
acknowledges the ways in which our so-called democratic institutions have arisen 
out of, and continue to perpetuate, the political, economic and ideological 
repression of Native North Americans’ (p. 66). This concern is also echoed by Walter 
Kohan (2018), who, following Freire’s moral condemnation of neutrality, contends 
that ‘[e]ducation cannot be apolitical, politically neutral or aseptic’ (p. 7). Purporting 
that education must be neutral, is a way of silencing the Other without admitting a 
standpoint, hiding behind the mask of neutrality. For these reasons and more, 
Rainville (2001) argues for ‘conscious partiality’.  
‘Conscious Partiality’ requires that teachers acknowledge their own 
(inevitable) biases, as well as the conceptual limitations of their 
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chosen material, while paying particular attention to the political 
contexts in which education takes place. As a result, Philosophy for 
Children must be willing to incorporate historical detail and socio-
cultural awareness into any programs which are meant to be truly 
liberatory. (p. 67) 
Rainville argues that education cannot be ahistorical; that teachers must 
understand the historical forces that shape the lives of their students, especially 
those to whom history has been oppressive.  
It needs to also be noted that philosophy itself is not epistemically or 
methodologically neutral. Karin Murris (2016) adds that the traditional ‘P4C 
curriculum is evaluative and prescriptive (in the sense of what counts as philosophy 
and what needs to be appropriated by the learners) and therefore normative’ (p. 67). 
Further, Chetty (2014) notes that ‘the selection of a text will itself steer a discussion, 
inasmuch that it will make some ideas more likely and others less likely to be 
explored’ (p. 25). Like other disciplines, philosophy and by extension Philosophy 
for Children is value laden and not separate from cultural discourse. However, 
philosophy as practice, such as a community of inquiry, ‘has the potential for self-
critique. To maintain an attitude of fallibilism toward our own biases and prejudices 
(those things we think not to question) is one of philosophy’s greatest strengths. In 
a community of inquiry this can be applied to facilitate students’ understanding of 
the world’s diversity of ideas’ (Thornton & Burgh, 2019, p. 235).  
Philosophy for Children has the potential to overcome neutrality, but in 
order for it to be empowering, we argue that two factors need to be considered. 
First, Matthew Lipman in his adaptation of Dewey, left behind the Deweyan 
emphasis on experiential education, in which learners engage directly with their 
environment so that the school becomes a place for the continuous reconstruction 
of experiences which increases students’ abilities to direct and control their lives as 
democratic citizens, and impacts on the greater community—an intermediary for 
social reconstruction. Put another way, he left the classroom/community dualism 
in place, which Dewey wished to avoid by coordinating experiencing and learning 
to facilitate meaningful connections, thereby achieving curriculum synthesis—
education as both a social and intellectual process. Bleazby picks up on Dewey to 
propose what she calls ‘social reconstruction learning’, which re-introduces 
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experiential learning, or service-learning, and works towards the ‘dismantling of 
problematic notions of rationality, selfhood and autonomy, which have worked to 
legitimise the control, domination and exploitation of the natural environment and 
of women, girls, indigenous people and many other marginalised groups’ (Bleazby, 
2020, n.p), thus, collapsing a number of dualisms. We believe this is a move in the 
right direction. However, the second factor to overcome neutrality is that service 
learning is a form of place-based education and, thus, to fully integrate social 
reconstruction learning requires attention to place. In the next section, we argue for 
the introduction of Indigenous notions of place, to remove any pretence of 
neutrality of place and, thus, also closing the gap on the human/nature dualism, as 
well as addressing Rainville’s concerns regarding the marginalisation of Indigenous 
peoples. 
 
philosophy for children and place-based education: introducing indigenous notions 
of place to develop a ‘sense of place’ 
Place-based education offers a potential solution to the problems of future 
instability and neutrality in education, but it is not without its own issues. Place-
based education is a community-based experiential approach to education that 
connects learning and communities in order to increase student engagement, as a 
way to achieve academic outcomes and student understanding of the world around 
them. Founded on the idea that the student’s local community – including the 
school grounds, neighbourhood, and suburb, town or city, as well as the 
communities within these places, each with their own history, environment and 
culture – is one of the primary learning resources for students, place-based 
education can assist communities in which schools are situated to solve community 
problems through student involvement facilitated by teachers. Such attempts at 
situating learning in the surrounding environments of the school community are 
certainly a step in the right direction and can extend or supplement classroom 
practice, as well as provide resources for integrating curriculum with pedagogy and 
assessment. However, while such place-based education programs can help to close 
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the classroom/community dualism, largely they still leave the human/nature 
dualism untouched.  
The literature on place-based education has grown considerably in recent 
years, and included in it are a number of critiques, adaptations and alternatives, 
including: pedagogy of place, critical pedagogy of place, place-based learning, 
community-based education, education for sustainability, environmental 
education, service learning and social reconstruction learning (e.g., see Dewey, 
1938; Russell & Bell, 1996; Gruenwald, 2003; Knapp, 2005; Bleazby, 2004, 2013; 
Goralnik, Dobson & Nelson, 2014; Ross, Oppegaard & Willerton, 2019). Some have 
arisen due to criticisms of purported neutrality of place. As we saw earlier, Western 
systems based on the human/nature dualism give rise to shadow places, those 
places that are depended upon but hidden from ethical view and obligation. A 
critical ethical and ecological awareness of place understands that place ‘manifests 
a way of knowing, and places are often objects of power created to further particular 
forms of domination based on gender, sexuality, race, age, class, and physical 
ability’ (Cravey & Petit, 2012, p. 102). For example, some place-based education 
schools, such as the increasingly popular forest schools, have been criticised for 
being ‘rooted in idealized and romanticized notions of nature and childhood’ 
(Nxumalo & Cedillo, 2017, p. 100). Plumwood (2012) notes how such notions of 
nature contribute to the human/nature divide and exclude Indigenous 
understandings of Place. 
Wilderness tends to be understood, however, as something that is 
separate from land that is used, land that supports us. There is a 
sundering, a splitting in this outlook that differs from an Indigenous 
understanding of unity of place. […] wilderness (wildness) was not 
a special place set apart as sacred in contrast to the profane earth. 
[…] all the earth was sacred and there was no necessary split 
between use and respect. (p. 31) 
What is missing in these approaches to place-based education, and place-
based education generally, is a focus on place as the development of a ‘sense of 
place’ vital to students’ formation of identity (Thornton & Burgh, 2019; Thornton, 
Graham & Burgh, 2019; Thornton, forthcoming). The community of inquiry as 
pedagogy, with its emphasis on fallibilism and self-correction, can aid in the 
development of ecologically minded identities, however, the human/nature divide 
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must also be overcome. Bleazby (2020), who has written extensively on the 
collapsing of dualisms in education, notes that ‘the theory/practice, mind/body, 
nature/culture dualisms are not fully deconstructed in traditional Philosophy for 
Children classrooms, which emphasise philosophical thinking and dialogue but do 
not usually engage students in transformative interaction with the environment 
beyond the classroom’ (n.p.). In response, Bleazby’s (2013) social reconstruction 
learning reconstructs Philosophy for Children by integrating it with service 
learning, a Deweyan kind of experiential learning, but she also draws on feminist 
pragmatism, ecofeminism, and the community of inquiry pedagogy to engage 
students in ‘philosophical inquiries with their local community with the purpose of 
reconstructing actual social problems, in order to facilitate independent thinking, 
imaginativeness, emotional intelligence, autonomy, and active and informed 
citizenship’ (p. 3). This is achieved by identifying and analysing social problems ‘in 
order to develop and implement solutions that will meaningfully transform them’, 
which ‘requires students to develop complex inquiry-practical skills and caring 
dispositions’ (p. 158). Thus, reconstruction occurs not only in the students, but in 
the society and individual citizens they assist. 
Social reconstruction learning holds potential for the kind of place-based 
education we propose, as it emphasises Dewey’s notion of reconstruction, namely, 
education as an ongoing re-organisation or reconstruction of experience that 
increases student’s ability to direct and control their lives, rather than acting as: a 
preparation for something else (e.g., being job ready or a citizen); an unfolding of 
innate knowledge and abilities (nativist or Platonic view of education); a training of 
mental faculties; the acquisition of knowledge and skills; or the perpetuation of 
tradition. However, greater emphasis on place is still needed. For example, service-
learning focusses on experiential learning that is rooted in the local community and 
synthesises the curriculum through student and school staff involvement in solving 
community problems—for Dewey the emphasis was on social occupations that 
integrated subject matter (i.e., curriculum knowledge) and experiences with work 
carried on in social life. In addition, service-learning can also incorporate place-
based learning, with attention to the unique history, environment, culture, 
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economy, literature, or art of a particular place. However, attention needs to also be 
on the ontological relationship to land in order for social reconstruction learning to 
become, what Denzin & Lincoln (2008) call, ‘a form of praxis and inquiry that [is] 
emancipatory and empowering’ (p. 2); one that is epistemically open, reflective, 
self-correcting and multivoiced (p. 6). In other words, pedagogy that is place-
responsive (Renshaw & Tooth, 2018). 
In recent years, Indigenous conceptions of place, which are integral to 
Indigenous ways of knowing, being and doing, especially the ontological 
relationship to Land (Graham, 1999, 2014; Moreton-Robinson, 2015), have been 
increasingly advocated by non-Indigenous scholars and Indigenous scholars alike. 
The centring of Indigenous concepts of Place in schooling, especially education for 
sustainability and environmental education, is necessary in order to decolonise 
mainstream education by interfacing Indigenous and Western epistemologies, 
values and philosophy in order to mitigate the epistemic injustices and 
environmental crises brought about by the domination of Western colonial 
institutions and practices (Thornton, Graham & Burgh, 2019). In this way, place-
based education has the potential to not only accommodate Indigenous notions of 
Land as part of experiential learning, but Indigenous perspectives on relations to 
land can broaden the understanding of Place in place-based education and reshape 
it. As discussed above, for Indigenous peoples in Australia, Place is a complex and 
related concept with ties to Aboriginal ethics and systems of governance that cannot 
be separated. Place-based philosophical education must centre Indigenous notions 
of Land as part of experiential learning, and, therefore, broaden understandings of 
Place. But it also points to the need for a fundamental reconstruction of education 
in order to make it ethical. Breaking down the barriers between, for example, 
human/nature, outside/inside, nature/school, society/education, is an important 
part of Place-based education and a way to develop a collective spiritual identity 
through  
[a]ccommodation within the education system of programs with 
activities through which this identity [a collective spiritual identity] 
is grown in children, activities such as groups caring for particular 
chosen tracts of land, not only via gardening, but tending, having 
recreational and ceremonial activities there, creating stories about 
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and artistic expressions of the relevant sites, protecting them from 
damage, and maintaining continuity with them throughout the 
formative years of childhood and on into adulthood. (Graham, 
1999) 
Moreover, the reconstruction of learning in the classroom must include 
breaking down means of assimilation which create hyper-separated identities. 
Although assimilation is most obvious when it comes to Western logic’s 
assimilation of other cultures, Western education is the means by which all in 
attendance are assimilated into the dominant logic by educators who have 
themselves been assimilated. ‘To cease assimilation, we must create ecologically 
rational identities by deconstructing our (colonial) own and our (colonial) culture’s 
opposition to both nature and Other, both within and outside the classroom’ 
(Thornton, Graham & Burgh, 2019, p. 247).  Recognising the chain of dominant logic 
is the first step in breaking it. Neutrality is a link in this chain, for, as Freire (1987) 
put it, 
the dominant ideology makes its presence in the classroom 
partly felt by trying to convince the teacher that he or she must 
be neutral in order to respect the student. This kind of 
neutrality is a false respect for students. On the contrary, the 
more I say nothing about agreeing or not agreeing out of 
respect for the others, the more I am leaving the dominant 
ideology in peace! (p. 174). 
There is no impartiality in white-washing or denying history or in creating a 
false narrative of independence, i.e., creating shadow places actively backgrounds 
the historical and present contexts in which schools are situated and reinforces 
existing structures of oppression by rejecting other ways of knowing, being and 
doing in the world. If colonisation creates shadow places by hiding the links 
between your existence and the places upon which it is predicated, then taking note 
of the links that maintain your life, that shape, create and grow you and your 
community – be it school, family or corporation – is a way of reconstructing not 
only knowledge, but your own identity and sense of place in the world. To these 
ends, ‘[d]eliberate efforts need to be made to seek out and include texts, materials, 
ideas, and methods from non-Western and marginalised perspectives, like 
indigenous and Eastern philosophies’ (Bleazby, 2020, n.p.). 
thornton; graham; burgh 
childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 17, abr. 2021, pp. 01- 29                 issn 1984-5987                  25 
The place-based education we propose here places new demands on teachers 
in terms of pre-service and in-service teacher education. Our concern is twofold: 
teachers need the skills to facilitate philosophical communities of inquiry to: (1) 
engage in place-based social reconstruction learning, and (2) develop 
understandings of ontological connections and their own relational identity, 
especially with land. While it is the topic of a separate paper, involving Indigenous 
teacher-educators in the design and delivery of such training is a necessary 
condition for effective pre-service and in-service teacher education. Such 
involvement would provide opportunities to collaboratively develop greater 
understanding of different kinds of ontological connections to and experiences of 
place and what it means to have a sense of place.  
 
conclusion 
Given the current state of global affairs in which we find ourselves, e.g., 
COVID-19, climate change, economic instability, and war, education must 
relinquish aspirations of neutrality for the curriculum, pedagogy, and place. We 
contend that such aspirations only serve to forward existing dominant logics, 
usually the very same logics that have paved the way toward many of the crises we 
now face and have shaped many of Empire’s institutions, including education. We 
hold that rethinking neutrality necessitates rethinking the role of education, which, 
in turn, necessitates rethinking place and our ethical obligations to it. Rethinking 
place requires input from outside the dominant systems of rationality which 
constrain our moral imagination and hamper intellectual freedom (Burgh & 
Thornton 2019b; Hyde, 2016; Thornton, Graham & Burgh, 2019).  
As we have argued, the community of inquiry as pedagogy can facilitate the 
development of ecologically minded identities by emphasising a ‘sense of place’ 
necessary for students’ formation of identity. The incorporation of place-based 
education as place-responsive pedagogies (Renshaw & Tooth, 2018) emphasises 
that place is not a neutral space but belonging to a historical and cultural context. 
As such, it can contribute to education for stability by providing an interdisciplinary 
approach to identity formation that can respond adequately to climate change and 
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related large-scale issues such as wildfires and COVID-19, through an ontological 
shift away from the logic of the liberal hyper-separated identity to education 
towards ecologically aware citizens (Thornton, forthcoming). To do this requires 
the decolonisation of education. As ‘colonization is fundamentally about 
dispossessing Indigenous peoples from land, decolonization must involve forms of 
education that reconnect Indigenous peoples to land and the social relations, 
knowledges and languages that arise from the land’ (Wildcat, McDonald, Irlbacher-
Fox & Coulthard, 2014, p. ii).  
Place-responsive pedagogies, such as critical Indigenous place-based 
pedagogies, underscore the importance of ‘collectively understanding and 
deconstructing individual and communal narratives of place that influence how we 
understand our regions and nations’ (Lowan-Trudeau, 2017, p. 514). Critical 
Indigenous place-based pedagogies seek ‘to decolonize and reinhabit the storied 
landscape through “reading” the ways in which Indigenous peoples’ places and 
environment have been injured and exploited’ (Johnson, 2012, p. 829). Such a 
reading casts light on the shadow places traditional classrooms create. Such a 
grounding provides a notion of place as ontological and necessary to identity 
formation in education to mitigate place neutrality; the view of place as just a 
location in which experiential learning occurs. Reconstructing place is a necessary 
step toward social reconstruction and the formation of social and ecological 
identities: teachers, students, parents, and the wider communities.  
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